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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 16591 
ROBERT JAMES SALMON and TOMMY 
LEE BENWELL, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants were charged with unlawfully entering 
a building with intent to commit theft therein, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953, as amended) 
(R. 12). On May 8, 1979, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen 
entertained a motion to dismiss charges on entrapment grounds 
(R. 16, 17). An entrapment hearing was held on May 10, 1979, 
after which the defendants' motion was denied ·(R. 18). Trial 
before a jury was set for May 30, 1979 (R. 19). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LQ\·JER COURT 
On May 30, 1979, the appellants were convicted as 
charged before a jury in the Fourth Judicial Distri"ct Court, 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge presiding (R. 40 
, 42)' ' 
Both appellants were later sentenced to be confined to the 
Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests that the judgment 
of guilt entered against appellants be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellants resided in the State of California 
prior to the events in question. The two men traveled to 
Utah by car following several conversations with John Bucy, 
a friend of the appellants. Mr. Bucy lived with Jamie Flower 
Before the appellants arrived in Utah, Flowers was told by 
John Bucy that the appellants were coming to Utah for the 
purpose of robbing some Utah drugstores (R. 183, 191). 
Based on this belief, Flowers notified James H. Gillespie 
of the Department of Public Safety, State Liquor and Narcotic 
Enforcement, that he (Flowers) had information that two men .e: 
on their way from California to Utah for the purpose of 
committing burglaries in the State of Utah (R. 191, 132). 
This conversation by phone took place on April 10, 1979. 
Mr. Gillespie thereafter assigned Floyd Hansen to cont~t 
Flowers to as.certain further information (R. 133). 
-2-
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Mr. Flowers had never met the appellants prior 
to their arrival in Utah the morning of April 11, 1979 
(R. 182). Appellants were then without means of supporting 
themselves and they stayed at Flowers' house during their 
visit. The appellants were also without transportation as 
their car had broken down so they asked Flowers if he would 
drive them around on that evening and point out some of the 
drugstores in the area (R. 183). 
Fl:owers met with Floyd Hansen on April ll and a 
listening device was attached to Flowers' person (R. 195). 
That evening Flowers, Bucy, and the appellant drove around 
Salt Lake City, Draper and Riverton (R. 196). The "Fargo" 
listening device was operating during this time and Hansen, 
who was maintaining surveillance by vehicle, was able to 
hear the conversation in the Flowers' car over the device 
(R. 196-198). 
The following day, April 12, appellants again 
asked Flowers to drive them around. Appellants asked Flowers 
if he knew of any drugstores outside of Salt Lake City (R.193), 
and if he knew of any drugstores there. Flowers told them about 
Orem and three places he knew of there. Flowers thereafter 
contacted Gillespie and Hansen to advise them that appellants 
wished to travel to Orem that evening (R. 193). The Orem 
City Police were informed as to where the burglaries would most 
likely occur (R. 139). 
-3-
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The night of April 12 and early morning f 
o April !J, 
Flowers drove Bucy and the appellants to Orem. After appella:~ 
checked two pharmacies in the Orem area, appellants had 
Flowers drive to the Cascade Medical Center (R. 81). The 
appellants got out of the car and entered the South end of 
the building carrying what appeared to be an empty sack 
(R. 82-84, 93, 94). The appellants were seen inside the 
building passing back and forth in front of a lit window 
(R. 82-84). Appellants emerged from the building approximate! 
fifteen minutes later dragging a heavy bag behind them (R. Bi, 
94). The two men got back into the car which drove out of 
the center's parking lot toward Orem Boulevard (R. 84), The 
appellants were thereafter arrested after the vehicle was 
stopped by Parole Sargeant Terry Taylor (R. 104, 105, 107). 
William Young and Jackie Murphy, detectives, Orem 
City Police Department, searched the car in which appellants 
had been passengers and removed from the backseat a white 
pillowcase, a Kidd fire extinguisher, a phone answering syst: 
~..F radio, an electric typewriter, a calculator, screwdriver: 
and leather gloves (R. 85, 98). These items were given to 
Jackie Murphy, the evidence officer at the time for the Orem 
City Police (R. 95). Murphy locked up the evidence describe: 
and took both articles with her to Court on May 30, 1979. 
-4-
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Jamie Flowers testified at trial that he had 
never suggested or insisted that appellants commit a burglary 
or any other crimes (R. 187). Floyd Hansen, a police agent, 
had the opportunity to listen to conversation in the Flowers' 
car through a "Fargo" listening device, and testified that 
he never heard Flowers indicate that he wanted anyone to 
commit a crime (R. 197). Hansen never heard Flowers 
threaten the appellants and he never heard the appellants 
state that they "didn't want to do this." (R. 198). 
Similar testimony was given by James H. Gillespie, Jr., 
field supervisor for the department of Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement (R. 133, 134). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS ERRONEOUSLY COMPLAIN OF 
THEIR CONVICTION BY APPLYING A 
LEGAL STANDARD NOT IN EFFECT AT THE 
TIME OF TRIAL. 
Up until this Court's decision of State v. Taylor, 
(Nos. 15631 and 15645, filed August 7, 1979), Utah courts 
examined the defense of entrapment, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-303 
(1953, as amended), by employing a subjective test. That 
test requires a showing that the idea of the crime originate 
in the mind of a police officer, who then induces the 
defendant to commit the crime. The test also requires a 
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determination of whether the defendant is a person predispose: 
to commit this sort of a crime. This is done by focusing on 
the defendant's character. The appellants, however, contend 
that under the objective test for entrapment, their en- · 
trapment defense should have been upheld and their motion 
to dismiss should have been granted. The objective test 
also requires that the plan for crime originate in the 
police officer's mind, but then the focus shifts to the 
police conduct. The test then asks if the police conduct 
involved a substantial risk of inducing persons to engage 
in criminal conduct who ordinarily would not engage in that 
sort of conduct. 
A. 
THE PROPER LEGAL STANDARD \'i'AS APPLIED 
CORRECTLY. 
At the time of the appellant's trial, the subjecti 
test, still used by the majority of states, was the proper 1 
legal standard in force and was applied correctly. 
The jury found that the plan to burglarize the 
cascade Medical Center did not originate in any police 
officer's mind. The appellants argue that Flowers, an 
informant for the police, planned and induced the crime. 
However, the testimony at trial was sufficient to allow 
the jury to weigh the evidence and conclude that, indeed, 
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there had been no entrapment. Floyd Hansen testified that he 
never heard (through the "Fargo" listening device) Flowers 
urged the appellants to commit a crime nor did Flowers tell 
them how they should do the job. There was also testimony 
that the appellants had come to Utah intending to burglarize 
drugstores. Thus, there was evidence as to the origin of 
the plan for crime and the defendants' propensity to commit 
crime. In their task of weighing the evidence and the credibility 
of witnesses, the jury believed this evidence and therefore 
found that the appellants had not been entrapped. 
Moreover, under either the subjective or the 
objective test, there could be no entrapment since Flowers 
was not a police agent. In State v. Taylor, (Nos. 15631 
and 15645 at p. 6 & 7, filed August 7, 1979), this Court 
said, "Entrapment, as a defense, is not available to one 
who is induced by a private person to commit a crime. 
Since entrapment can be asserted only when one is induced 
to commit a crime by a government agent, the obvious focus 
of this defense is directed to the conduct of the government." 
There was evidence at trial that Flowers was not a "government 
agent." Mr. Gillespie testified that Flowers did not work 
for him and was not an agent of the police force (R. 135) · 
-7-
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Appellants are asking this Court to apply the 
objective test in this case, as was done in State v. Taylor 
_, 
in order to avoid the J0 ury's verdict. Th 11 e appe ants were 
convicted by a jury on May 30, 1979. State v. Taylor 
was decided by this Court on August 7, 1979. What appeliants 
actually seek then is retroactive application of State v. 
Taylor, (Nos. 15631 and 15645, filed August 7, 1979). 
B. 
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. 
TAYLOR, ANNOUNCING ADOPTION OF THE 
OBJECTIVE TEST, SHOULD NOT BE 
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. 
The criteria for retroactive application of a 
new court-created rule in the area of criminal law was 
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. 
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). In that case, the court 
refused to retroactively apply Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), a decision rendered just ~ week before ~ 
was heard by the Court. In determining whether to give 
retrospective or prospective effect to decisions adopti~ 
such new rules, the Court listed these considerations: 
(1) the purpose of the rule involved; (2) reliance placed 
upon the former rule; and (3) the effect which 
retroactive application of the new rule would have on the 
administration of justice. 384 U.S. 727. 
-8-
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First, the purpose of the new rule in determining 
entrapment (the objective test), is deterrance of police 
misconduct. Under the Johnson rationale, retroactive 
application is only justified if the new rule affects "the 
very integrity of the fact-finding process" and averted 
"the clear danger of convicting the innocent." Id. at 727, 
728. The Court in Johnson illustrated this standard by 
pointing to cases where the Court had given retroactive 
effect to constitutional rules of criminal procedure such 
as decisions establishing the right to counsel at trial or 
a probation revocation hearing, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963), and Memoha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
Another example of retroactive application of new rules involved 
the right of an indigent to free transcript on appeal. Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
A new rule affecting police conduct does not 
qualify as a constitutional rule of criminal procedure which 
enhances "the reliability of the fact-finding process." 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 728, 729 (1966). Appellants 
were not denied any procedural rights. They were accorded 
a heari-hg on their motion to dismiss. The court determined 
that there was no valid entrapment defense and properly 
submitted the issue to the jury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303(4) 
(5) (1953, as amended). The accused had competent counsel at 
trial and were afforded a jury trial. The integrity of the 
fact-finding process which resulted in their convictions was not 
threatened by use of the subjective test then in ef_fect. 
-9-
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Furthermore, the purpose of the new rule 
(deterring police misconduct) is similar to those cases 
in which retroactive application is denied. In Linkle~ 
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), a decision barring use of 
evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure was not 
applied retroactively; the purpose of the rule was to 
deter the police from conducting unlawful searches. 
Deist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), refused to 
retroactively apply Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967) , a decision which precluded the use of evidence 
obtained by electronic eavesdropping. Finally, Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a decision limiting the 
police's right to interrogate defendants without the 
presence of counsel, was not applied retroatively in 
Johnson v. New Jersey, supra. The Court reasoned that 
deprivation of counsel during the investigative stage 
does not necessarily impair the integrity of the truth-
£ inding process. In all of these cases, as in the instant 
case, the purpose of the new rule was to deter police 
misconduct. In all of the cases retroactive application 
was denied. Respondent submits that the Utah Supreme 
Court in Taylor, supra, made clear that the focus of its ; 
-10-
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decision was to prevent police misconduct and did not go 
to the integrity of the fact-finding process. For 
example, at p. 13 of the green sheet opinion, this court 
states: 
It should be emphasized that defendant 
engaged in conduct proscribed by statute 
and was guilty of a crime. However, his 
conviction cannot stand for the reason the 
statute condemns the conduct of the state 
in inducing the crime, as a perversion of 
the proper standards of administration of 
criminal law. 
Moreover, at p. 11, this Court discusses why the objective 
test was adopted over the subjective test, to-wit: to 
curb police misconduct. Respondent therefore contends 
that, for this reason alone, retroactive application of 
State v. Taylor (Nos. 15631 and 15645, filed August 7, 1979), 
should be denied. 
Secondly, the United States Supreme Court in 
Johnson, supra, also stated that the fact that retroactive 
application of a decision would seriously disrupt the 
administration of criminal laws was a valid consideration 
in determining retroactivity. 384 U.S. at 731. Here, 
retroactive application of Taylor would require the retrial 
or release of numerous prisoners--an unjustifiable burden 
on the administration of justice. 
-11-
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More important is the reliance law enforcement 
officials placed on the subjective test applied in the 
pre-Taylor decisions. Applying Taylor retrospectiveh 
would place a different and possibly a heavier burden upon 1 
prosecutors. See Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 
(1969). Before Taylor, when entrapment was asserted as a 
defense, the focus was not solely on police conduct, but 
also on the defendant's predisposition to commit a crime. 
However, now the focus is directed to the conduct of the 
government, and the prosecutor has a different evidentiary 
burden because the objective test eliminates presentation 
proof by evidence of the accused's er iminal character or 
predisposition by evidence of past offenses. See ~· 
Taylor, supra. 
In Green v. Turner, 443 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 19111 
the Tenth Circuit held that the United States Supreme Court\ 
decision of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), did not! 
apply retroactively even though Boykin was a landmark 
decision which established the modicum of due process 
required before a guilty plea could be accepted. If ~ 
f h · h ff t d th fundamental consti· and Boykin, both o w ic a ec e e 
· f as the type: tutional rights of a defendant, did not qual1 Y 
of case which could be applied retrospectively, surely~ 
does not justify retroactive application to defendants 
similarly situated. 
-12-
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In State v. Kelbach, 461 P.2d 297 (Utah 1969), 
this Court refused to apply United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218 (1967), retroactively because the police lineup 
in which the defendants were identified occurred prior 
to June 12, 1967, the date of the~ decision. No 
further explanation of this ruling was made, thus implying, 
perhaps, a strict rule that there should not be retro-
spective application of a decision which does not 
expressly provide for such application. 
In another Utah decision, the State advocated 
a change in the construction of Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 
(1953, as amended), and also asked that the change be 
retroactive so as to apply to the proceeding. State v. 
Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977). This Court declined 
and appeared to voice a general principle "of honoring 
the established law. If there is to be such a change in 
the law whether by legislative act or by judicial decision, 
it seems that it should have only prospective effect." 
Id. at 1102. 
Therefore, respondent submits that State v. 
Taylor should have only prospective effect because retro-
spective application would impose too great a burden on 
administrators and on law enforcement officials and 
prosecutors who have relied on prior decisions regarding 
entrapment. 
-13-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
A PORTION OF APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY ON 
HEARSAY GROUNDS. 
The appellants cite as alternative grounds 
for reversal their argument that testimony offered by 
one of the appellants was improperly excluded as hearsay. 
At trial a question was asked on direct 
examination by the defense which referred to Flowers' 
conduct in inducing appellants to commit crimes. The 
position of the defense had been that Flowers had made 
statements which induced the crime, for example, that 
Flowers wanted the men to burglarize a drugstore and 
that they should do it in a certain manner, etc. The 
prosecutor, therefore, objected to the answer given: 
"Well, for one he drove us around. He was talking about 
. , " on the ground that was hearsay since the statement 
was offered to show the truth of the matter asserted 
(R.153,154, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63). Counsel 
stated that the statement was offered for their truth 
as the statements were at issue in determining whether 
Flowers had induced the appellants to commit the burglary. 
Appellants contend that the testimony was not offered 
to show that the statements were true. 
Respondents submit that if the statements were 
· h · t th th ev1' dence would offered for anything but t eir ru , e 
-14-
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be irrelevant as lacking any tendency to prove the 
existence of any material fact. Rule 1, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. In other words, unless the statements were 
true, they could not show that the appellants had been 
entrapped. The statements could only have been crucial 
evidence going to the issue of entrapment if they had 
been true--that Flowers uttered words designed to induce 
or compel the appellants to burglarize the Cascade 
Medical Center. Thus, the trial court properly excluded 
the evidence as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 63, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Appellant cites State v. Kasai, 540 P.2d 949 
(Utah 1975) , as the rule to be applied in determining whether 
reversal is justified. Respondent suggests that even had 
there been error below, admission of the appellant's 
testimony would not have resulted in a different result. 
The testimony of Hansen and Gillespie was that Flowers 
had not made statements which would induce the commission 
of a crime (R.133,134,197,198). Such was also the 
testimony of Flowers himself. The defense had the 
opportunity to cross examine and cross examination of 
Flowers did not reveal any retraction of his testimony on 
direct examination. It was the jury's task, therefore, 
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1 
to weigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses 
and there is nothing which would indicate the likelihood 
of a different result had the appellant's testimony not been 
admitted. Therefore, reversal is not justified in this case 
because the trial court did not err in excluding hearsay and 
such exclusion was not prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, therefore, urges this Court to uphold 
the guilty verdict entered against the appellants in the 
court below because the legal standard in determining 
entrapment was properly applied. Furthermore, retroactive 
application of State v. Taylor should not be applied for the 
reason stated in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 u. s. 719 (1966), 
and because the evidence at trial shows that even under the 
objective test, the jury could still find that the appellan 
were not entrapped. 
Finally, the judgment of guilt should not be 
reversed because the trial court properly excluded testimonJ 
of statements offered for the truths of the matter assertal 
which is prohibited by Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of EViden 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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